What is a Company Really Worth? Intangible Capital and the "Market to Book Value" Puzzle by Charles R. Hulten & Xiaohui Hao
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
WHAT IS A COMPANY REALLY WORTH? INTANGIBLE CAPITAL AND THE









The research reported in this paper was sponsored by the Economics Program of The Conference Board,
as part of its Program on Intangibles. It is derived from an earlier Economics Program working paper,
#08-02. Hulten is Senior Fellow to The Conference Board. We would like to thank Wesley Cohen,
Martin Fleming and Baruch Lev for their comments on earlier drafts, as well as Gail Fosler, Bart Van
Ark, Carol Corrado, and other colleagues at the Conference Board. Kathleen Miller and Mary Sinclair
provided valuable assistance in preparing this paper. Opinions and interpretations, and any remaining
errors, are solely the responsibility of the authors, and should not be attributed to any organization
with which they are affiliated, nor to the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2008 by Charles R. Hulten and Xiaohui Hao. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice,
is given to the source.What is a Company Really Worth? Intangible Capital and the "Market to Book Value" Puzzle
Charles R. Hulten and Xiaohui Hao




"What is a company really worth?" is a question asked repeatedly during the recent financial crisis.
Attention has been focused on short-term valuation issues, like the "mark-to-market" controversy.
Sorting out these issues is complicated by the fact that the market puts a value on shareholder equity
that is consistently more than twice the reported book value of a company. Numerous observers have
pointed to the absence of most intangible assets from financial statements as an important source of
this puzzle. We use Compustat financial data for 617 R&D intensive firms to test this possibility. We
find that conventional book value alone explains only 31 percent of the market capitalization of these
firms in 2006, and that this increases to 75 percent when our estimates of intangible capital are included.
The debt-equity ratio also falls from 1.46 to 0.61. These findings suggest that financial reports tend
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I.  Introduction 
 
  “What is a company really worth?” is a question that has been asked repeatedly 
during the recent financial crisis.  The market place provides a compelling answer:  a 
company and its assets are worth only what the highest bidder is willing to pay.  In 
theory, this value should equal the expected discounted present value of the future 
earnings, sometimes thought of as the intrinsic or “holding” value of the assets.  In 
practice, it does not.  During periods of market turbulence, the two valuations can 
diverge significantly because of asymmetrical information and liquidity constraints.  The 
recent “mark-to-market” debate is largely about which approach provides the more 
accurate reflection of fair value when markets are volatile.  This debate is complicated 
by the fact that, even in calmer times, there is the “market-to-book value” puzzle to 
explain.  
  This puzzle arises because the market consistently puts a higher value on 
shareholder equity than the value appearing on corporate balance sheets.  The average 
price-to-book ratio for the companies of the S&P 500 index ranged from around 2.0 to 
3.5 in the period 1990-1995, and increased to the 3.5-7.5 range during the “tech boom” 
period 1996-2000 (Lev (2001)).  Even during the recent stock market slump, the ratio 
has remained in the range of 1.5 to 2.0.  
  This price-to-book gap is too large to be attributed solely to the mismeasurement 
of conventional equity or to the vicissitudes of the stock market.  Numerous observers, 
including Lev, have pointed to absence of intangible assets from corporate balance 
sheets as an important source of the puzzle.  The billions of dollars companies spend   2
on R&D and brand development are treated as current expenses by their accountants 
largely because there are no market transactions to measure the value of R&D and 
brand created within the company.  The current success of many companies and their 
prospects for the future, however, depend on their ability to develop and market 
products, not just the ability to manufacture them.  Portraying the product development 
only as a current expense without recognizing its contribution to future value conceals 
much of what makes a company successful and valuable in the long run.
1 
  How much of the market-to-book value puzzle can be explained by intangible 
assets is the question examined in this paper.  We approach the problem by applying 
procedures similar to those used by Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2006) to financial data 
for 617 R&D-intensive corporations complied by Standard and Poor’s in its Compustat 
database.
2  We construct estimates of the cost of in-house investment in R&D and 
organizational capital using data for the period from 1988 to 2006, and then estimate 
the corresponding stocks in current prices.  We find that the addition of these 
intangibles to the conventional financial accounts increases shareholder equity by 141 
percent and total assets by 57 percent in 2006, and increases the earnings per share 
from an average of $2.48 to $3.54. 
                                                 
1   A growing literature explores the problem of accounting for intangibles in financial reports and valuing 
intangibles in the stock market, building on an earlier literature that examined the impact of R&D and 
advertising on the rate of profit (e.g., Grabowski and Mueller (1978)). Important overviews are provided by 
Lev (2001) and Blair and Waldman (2001).  The literature on the economics of intangibles is reviewed in 
Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2005, 2006), and in the introductory comments of Corrado, Haltiwanger, and 
Sichel (2005). 
 
2  Recent estimates by Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (CHS (2005, 2006)) suggest that there were 
approximately $3.6 trillion in intangible assets in the U.S. nonfarm business sector in the period 2000-
2003, compared with some $11 trillion in tangible plant and equipment.  These estimates cover both 
corporate and noncorporate companies, although corporations accounted for some three-quarters of the 
total, according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis figures.  The large size of the aggregate effect 
suggests that the average impact on the individual corporations in the non-farm business sector is also 
large. 
   3
  As for the market-to-book value puzzle, we find that conventionally-defined equity 
alone explains 31 percent of market capitalization, and this increases to 75 percent 
when intangible capital is added to the balance sheets.  This fills a significant part of the 
valuation gap and, more importantly, suggests that current financial practice 
understates the long-run intrinsic value of corporate America by a substantial amount.   
  Another implication of this line of analysis is that the degree of leverage, a closely 
watched indicator of financial health during the financial crisis, is significantly lower 
when intangibles are counted.  For our sample of R&D intensive companies, largely 
outside the financial sector, the debt-equity ratio falls from 1.46 to 0.61 when intangible 
assets are added to both numerator and denominator of the ratio.  In other words, when 
the equity hidden in intangibles is put on display, the presence of debt on the balance 
sheet takes on a different significance for long-run valuation. 
  The following sections of this paper describe the details underlying these 
estimates.  We start with the case of a representative company in one year as a 
concrete illustration of the issues in capitalizing internally produced intangibles.  We 
then move to a parallel analysis of the universe of R&D-intensive companies included in 
the S&P database.  Finally, we use our data to examine the correlation between our 
intangible capital stocks and market valuation to establish that intangibles are, indeed, 
capital.   4
II.  The Case of a Representative R&D-Intensive Company 
A.  Revenue With and Without Intangibles 
  The case of a pharmaceutical company, PHARMA, illustrates the problems of 
recognizing intangibles.  PHARMA operates in the pharmaceutical industry, one of the 
most R&D-intensive industries of the U.S. economy.
3  According to the composite 
annual financial statements, PHARMA revenues totaled $29.6 billion in 2006.  The cost 
of goods sold was $6.4 billion. R&D and sales and administrative expenses (SG&A) 
totaled $13.7 billion, or nearly half of total sales.  After subtracting depreciation, taxes, 
and other adjustments, after-tax income was $5.5 billion and earnings per share (EPS) 
amounted to $2.03.  PHARMA reported total assets of $50.9 billion on its balance sheet 
in 2006, of which property, plant and equipment accounted for $10.1 billion.  These data 
are shown in summary in Tables 1 and 2, in the first column labeled “10k”.
4 
This is the standard version of PHARMA’s 2006 financial report, following the 
convention that financial reports treat R&D expenditures as a current expense and 
subtracts them from the sales figure on the top line.  In this paper, we treat R&D as an 
investment in the company instead of a pure cost and examine what effect this has on 
                                                 
3    PHARMA is a composite of six large companies in the U.S. pharmaceutical industry:  Abbott 
Laboratories, the Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, Eli Lilly and Company, Johnson and Johnson, Pfizer 
Inc., and Wyeth.  The financial statements of PHARMA are based on an average of the publicly available 
income statement and balance sheets of these six companies, supplemented by external estimates and 
assumptions.  This averaging procedure attenuates the effects of firm-specific events like mergers and 
acquisitions, and special items on the financial statements of the individual companies.  The name 
PHARMA is an expository invention of this paper and should not be associated with the Pharmaceutical 
Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), or any other organization or company. 
 
Other R&D-intensive industries could have been used for expositional purposes, but the pharmaceutical 
industry was selected because it has a rich publicly available data and because it has an impressive track 
record of innovation.  The pharmaceutical industry also illustrates the problem that R&D investment has 
long gestation lags. 
 
4  We refer to PHARMA as a pharmaceutical company in this paper, but the pharmaceutical segment of 
PHARMA accounted for 75 percent of total 2006 revenue, while other segments, including other medical 
and consumer products, accounted for the rest.     5
the company’s financial accounts.  We will show that this alternative view of R&D 
involves an expanded concept of “output” and “revenues,” and, since this shift involves 
a significant departure from current practice, we illustrate the issues involved with the 
following thought experiment. 
  First, suppose that PHARMA were to purchase $10 million in tangible capital 
from another company, for example, a technologically advanced piece of laboratory 
equipment.  The standard economic assumption underlying this purchase is that 
PHARMA invests up to the point that the $10 million cost of the new equipment equals 
the discounted present value of the expected future profits created by the investment.
5  
Under conventional accounting practice, the investment would be added to PHARMA’s 
balance sheet at its cost of $10 million and amortized over time. 
  PHARMA’s accountants do not treat the $10 million tangible capital investment 
as an expense before figuring profit, but the company that sells the equipment to 
PHARMA does recognize the cost of producing the investment good as an expense and 
adds the $10 million sale to its revenues.  If the cost is, say, $8 million, it records a 
before-tax profit of $2 million.  
                                                 
5  This is the usual “neoclassical” formulation, in which arbitrage across alternative investments equates 
the opportunity cost of an investment, the $10 million, with the discounted present value of the expected 
income generated by the investment.  As noted in the introduction, the recent crash in the equity and 
credit markets is a reminder that the ex ante expectations built into the original cost of an investment are 
not necessarily equal to ex post outcomes (the mark-to-market versus intrinsic value approach to asset 
valuation).  In the best of worlds, it would be helpful to have accurate information on both ex ante and ex 
post asset values, because it would also give estimates of the implied ex ante and ex post rates of return 
on intangible projects.  Unfortunately, it is hard to “mark to market” assets for which there is no market at 
all, and the present value approach is impossible to implement from externally available data.  We 
therefore use the original cost of the owner-produced intangibles as our valuation metric.   6
  Now suppose that PHARMA contracts with another company, call it R&DCOR, to 
conduct $10 million in research on PHARMA’s behalf.
6  How does this situation differ 
from the case of the laboratory equipment?  One possibility is that the purchased R&D 
is an intermediate input to PHARMA’s production, that is, an input that is used up like 
office supplies in the year in which they are delivered.  However, this is inconsistent with 
the evidence presented in DiMasi (2001), who shows that the gestation period for a 
drug to make through the FDA approval process was 14.2 years during the 1980s and 
1990s (3.8 years for the pre-clinical phase, 8.6 for the clinical trials, and 1.8 for the 
approval phase).  These gestation lags essentially refute the idea that R&D is an 
intermediate input that disappears within a year, and virtually force the recognition that 
the $10 million in purchased R&D is an investment made in order to earn future profits.  
From an economic standpoint, it is no different than a $10 million investment in tangible 
laboratory equipment.     
As with the laboratory equipment, the company producing the R&D (R&DCOR) 
treats the $10 million received from PHARMA as revenue and allocates $8 million to the 
cost of producing the R&D and records a $2 million before-tax profit.  Moreover, if the 
financial statements of PHARMA and R&DCOR were combined for reporting purposes, 
the $10 million R&D transaction would appear as part of the combined revenue of the 
companies.
7  
                                                 
6  As before, R&DCOR is name used only for expositional purposes, and does not correspond to any 
actual company. 
 
7   At the macroeconomic level, the $10 million R&D transaction would be treated as investment in the 
U.S. national income and product accounts, though not as part of the core GDP accounts until 2013 
(Robins and Moylan (2007)).  The United Nation’s System of National Accounts has also endorsed the 
capitalization of R&D. 
   7
  Both of the preceding scenarios deal with externally purchased technology.  
Consider, now, the following situation in which R&DCOR is actually a subsidiary of 
PHARMA.  R&DCOR produces exactly the same R&D as in the preceding case, worth 
the same $10 million, but now the R&D is produced inside PHARMA and there is no 
external market transaction to validate the internal flow of value.  Under current 
accounting practice, the $10 million disappears from the revenue line of the income 
statement, because current practice treats the internal production of the R&D as an 
intermediate input, not as the output of an investment good.  Thus, the accountants 
record a current R&D expense of $8 million and suppress the $2 million profit earned by 
the independent R&D producer of the preceding scenario into the overall operating 
surplus. In other words, there is a fundamental asymmetry in accounting practice:  R&D 
is capitalized when the R&D is produced externally but expensed when it is produced 
internally. 
  What do PHARMA’s books look like when this asymmetry is removed?  By 
analogy with the hypothetical example above, the $4.9 billion in current R&D outlays, 
reported on line 6 of Table 1, would be treated as an investment and added to top-line 
revenues.  Also by analogy with the example, the $4.9 billion outlay would be increased 
by the return to the capital used in producing the R&D (the analogue of $2 million 
R&DCOR profit of the hypothetical example).  The actual magnitude of this return is 
unknown, and we therefore use an imputation procedure that allocates total operating 
surplus to R&D according to R&D’s share in current expenses.  This procedure 
attributes a further $2.3 billion to the cost of R&D, giving a total investment cost of $7.2 
billion.   8
  This is the cost side of the investment and if PHARMA is assumed to make its 
investment decisions using the discounted present value approach, the $7.2 billion is 
also the present value of the future profits on the investment.  By symmetry with 
tangible capital, we combine the $7.2 billion with PHARMA’s $29.6 billion revenue from 
goods sold to get a new top-line figure of $36.9 billion in the column labeled “+R&D" in 
Table 1. 
 
B.  The “New” View of Financial Accounting:  A Closer Look 
 
  We have made the case that tangible and intangible assets should be treated 
symmetrically for accounting purposes, but the case of R&D investment is actually more 
complicated because of the long gestation lags noted by DiMasi (2008) and because of 
the greater uncertainty about the expected income stream than tangible investment.   
Berndt et. al. (2006) show that only 40 percent of drugs that start the pre-clinical 
process make it to the clinical stage (the Phase I, II, and III trials of the FDA regulatory 
process), and only 8 percent of the drugs make it into the market place.  Given these 
odds, much of PHARMA’s $7.2 million R&D investment will disappear before it earns a 
return.  The very high degree of uncertainty about outcomes, particularly in the early 
stages of a research project, might be better characterized by a Schumpeterian or 
“animal spirits” model of the investment decision, with only a tenuous link between ex 
ante cost and ex post returns.   
Our $7.2 billion estimate does not include the opportunity cost of the money tied 
up in the investments during the long gestation period.  This opportunity cost depends   9
on the costs and survival experience of individual drug development project, and is 
therefore hard to estimate.  An important piece of evidence, in this regard, is provided 
by DiMasi, Hansen, and Grabowski (2003), who estimate that the average cost of 
bringing a drug to market is $802 million, and that about half of that amount reflects the 
time-value of money.
8  We should in principle adjust the $7.2 billion for the time value of 
money, but the adjustment suggested by the results of DiMasi et. al. is so large that we 
decided to err on the side of conservatism and note only that our estimate of the annual 
cost is probably underestimated by a significant amount. 
  
C.  Depreciation and Asset Valuation 
 
  As with plant and equipment, R&D investments depreciate in value over time. 
There is, however, an important difference.  Machines lose value because they are 
used up in production due to wear, tear, and accident, or because of the obsolescence 
arising from the development of superior types of machinery. R&D capital, on the other 
hand, is more closely tied to the output it generates and is therefore subject to 
obsolescence arising from competition from superior types of output, not superior 
inputs, as in the machinery case.  There is also another dimension not shared with 
tangible capital.  R&D knowledge is largely a non-rival public good whose benefits can 
                                                 
8   These issues are also problems for tangibles, but to a lesser degree.  For example, structures often 
take several years to build, from the planning through the construction stages of development, and money 
is tied up in the investment that imposes additional costs (and risk).  However, the problems posed by the 
gestation lags in tangible assets are generally not of the same magnitude as the lags in pharmaceutical 
R&D.  The value of the tangible investment is normally recorded at the point at which it is completed and 
ready for transfer to the buyer.  The transaction price thus includes a time-value adjustment in the final 
cost.  R&D investments, on the other hand, are self-constructed by the firm, and what is reported on the 
financial statement is the cost of the R&D in progress, and not the complete project.  There is thus no 
point at which an actual market-based time-value adjustment is made.     10
accrue to other users without diminishing the quantity available to the originator.  The 
value of the R&D to the originator, on the other hand, is limited to the commercial value 
that can be extracted from the investment.  If the knowledge diffuses to competitors, 
that value is eroded as competition leads to lower product prices.  Some degree of 
protection to the originator is promoted, but not assured, by copyrights and patents, and 
by secrecy, but diffusion almost always occurs at some point, and this leads to the 
deprecation in the original cost of the investment. 
  The commercial life-cycle of the products developed by R&D is the primary 
determinant of the depreciation rate of successful R&D programs, and there is also the 
depreciation arising from the unsuccessful programs.  It is therefore not surprising that 
the literature on this subject has produced a broad range of estimates that vary from 
around 10 percent to 25 percent (CHS (2006), Mead (2007)).  The recent study by Hall 
(2007) suggests that the range of uncertainty could be even wider.   Faced with this 
problem, we somewhat arbitrarily select an amortization procedure near the midpoint of 
the range in the literature and amortize each investment dollar (as it is spent) over a 
ten-year average life, using a pattern that declines slowly in the early years of the period 
and accelerates at the end.   
  The amortization of the R&D stock adds a depreciation charge of $3.2 billion to 
the income statement of Table 1 (column 2, line 11).  This offsets some of the $7.2 
billion increase in “revenue” and results in before-tax income of $10.9 billion (line 15).  
Taxes are assumed to be unaffected when R&D is capitalized (that is, R&D is assumed 
to be expensed for tax purposes), so after-tax income on line 17 is now $9.5 billion (a 
73 percent increase over the after-tax income of conventional accounting).  Earnings   11
per share increase from $2.03, the amount when R&D is expensed, to $3.52 when R&D 
is capitalized.
9  
  We also use our amortization procedure to estimate stock of R&D capital on the 
balance sheet.  We use a perpetual inventory method in which each year’s investment 
in R&D (e.g., $7.2 billion in 2006) added to the preceding year’s stock, and adjust for 
the depreciation of that stock.  R&D investments are initially recorded in the historical 
prices, and, as prices change, each year’s investment needs to be expressed in 
constant prices in order to insure comparability.  We use the price deflator in BEA’s 
R&D satellite account (see Robbins and Moylan (2007)) to convert R&D investment 
from historical prices to current prices.
10  We also adjust the annual depreciation 
estimates for price changes.
11  This procedure yields an estimate of the constant price 
R&D stock in each year, which we then reflate to current (not historical) prices using the 
BEA R&D price series.  The result is the $38.6 billion R&D stock recorded in Table 2 
(column 2, line 9).  This is important to emphasize the expected commercial value to 
PHARMA of its R&D stock. 
  The assumption of a 10-year write-off period is, at best, a guess based on the 
bits of econometric evidence in the literature on R&D, and may not apply to the case of 
                                                 
9  It is important to note that capitalizing intangibles does not necessarily increase after-tax incomes and 
EPS.  In companies where R&D programs are declining, the amortization cost may exceed the amount 
added to the top line from current expenditures.  In this situation, capitalizing R&D may reduce EPS (see 
Lev (2001)). 
 
10  We do not adjust the value of tangible assets from historical prices to current prices, because current 
accounting practice records tangible assets only at historical prices, with only occasional revaluation for 
price changes.  This introduces a potential bias in the balance sheet estimate of assets.  The size of the 
bias is suggested by BEA estimate that the current value of the fixed assets in the U.S. corporate 
business sector in 2006 was some 50 percent greater than the corresponding historical cost.  
 
11  We use our depreciation estimates to adjust both the income statement and the balance sheet.  Strictly 
speaking, this is an inconsistent procedure unless depreciation has the geometric (declining-balance) 
form.  Our procedure is not geometric and this introduces an inconsistency into the analysis, but the error 
is bound to be quite small compared to all the other uncertainties about the depreciation process.      12
PHARMA.  For one thing, it implies that all of the value of an investment from any year 
is gone after 10 years, and this is not consistent with the data on project survival.  As a 
robustness check, we computed an alternative R&D stock using the same general 
procedures but with a 20-year write-off period rather than the 10-year life as above.  
This alternative assumption of amortization results in an estimated stock of R&D capital 
of $55.2 billion, some $16 billion greater than the previous estimate.  Changes of this 
magnitude indicate that the estimates of Table 1 and 2 clearly depend on the magnitude 
of this uncertain parameter.   
 
D.  Organizational and Human Assets 
 
  R&D is not the only type of intangible expenditure in the innovation process.  
Pharmaceutical companies typically have large marketing budgets designed, in part, to 
launch new products and PHARMA is no exception.  It spent $1.6 billion on advertising 
in 2006 and this is only part of the total marketing expenses.
12  Some fraction of these 
expenditures are used to establish new drugs in the market place, and, once 
established, the resulting brand equity is an asset to the firm.  By analogy with R&D 
expenditures, this asset also belongs on the balance sheet of the company.
  
This view of marketing expenditures contrasts with the popular view that the 
marketing efforts of pharmaceutical companies are unproductive and merely serve to 
drive up the cost of drugs to the consumer.  This view implicitly assumes that a good 
drug will sell itself, implying a rapid and costless dissemination of information.  In fact, 
                                                 
12  This estimate uses advertising spending in 2006 of four companies:  Bristol-Myers Squibb, Johnson 
and Johnson, Pfizer, and Wyeth.  The other two companies provide no advertising data in 2006. 
      13
the up-take of new drugs is often slow even when they turn out to be highly efficacious, 
and even when drug companies make considerable marketing efforts.  One rationale for 
capitalizing some fraction of the marketing expenditures is that a company will not 
undertake the substantial cost of bringing a new drug to market (recall the $802 million 
estimate of DiMasi, Hansen, and Grabowski (2003)), unless the company expects to 
sell enough of it to at least cover its full costs.  Seen this way, the marketing of a new 
drug is a complementary coinvestment with R&D and therefore part of the innovation 
process. 
  PHARMA also invests in organizational development (e.g., strategic planning, 
new management systems) and worker training.
13  Brynjolfsson, Hitt, and Yang (2000, 
2002) and Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2005) note that much of the IT spending in the 1990s 
was a coinvestment with expenditures for organizational development. These 
investments were, in part, intended to increase the effectiveness of corporate 
management, and the evidence in Bloom and van Reenan (2006) suggests that they 
also increase the value of a company.  By implication, a fraction of such expenditures 
should be treated as capital for accounting purposes.  A number of papers report similar 
results for worker training (Bassi et. al. (2002), Black and Lynch (2005)).  
  Expenditures for brand equity and organizational development are reported on 
most financial statements, so we borrow the CHS procedures and translate their 
approximate proportions of brand equity and organizational development investment 
into a corresponding fraction of SG&A spending.  This leads us to impute about 30 
                                                 
 
13   For the nonfarm business sector as a whole, CHS estimate that the value of brand equity was $161 
billion in 2003, and $425 billion for the other forms of organizational capital. 
   14
percent of PHARMA’s total SG&A outlays in 2006 to investment in organizational 
capital.  The result is an additional $4.1 billion on the top line of PHARMA’s income 
statement, bringing the total revenue inclusive of all intangible to $41.0 billion. These 
estimates are shown in the last column of Table 1 (labeled “+ ORG K”). 
Organizational investments depreciate over time for a variety of reasons.  Brand 
equity loses value when new goods appear in the market place or the marketing 
programs of competitors cut into market share, and human capital erodes through 
worker attrition and with the adoption of new products, processes, and business 
models.  Management competencies erode for many of the same reasons.  There is a 
debate over the appropriate depreciation rates for each intangible asset (CHS (2006)), 
and there is little information on how PHARMA’s SG&A is split among different types of 
organizational investments.  Consequently, we adopt the simple assumption (based on 
CHS) that each investment dollar is amortized over a six year period, again using a 
pattern that declines slowly in the early years of the period and accelerates at the end.   
Using these procedures, we estimate that the depreciation/amortization of 
organizational capital amounted to $3.5 billion in 2006.  When applied to the $4.1 billion 
increase in revenue, after-tax income rose by $0.6 billion to a grand total of $10.1 
billion. 
Moving to the balance sheet, the estimated stock of organizational capital was 
found to be $16.3 billion (column 3, line 10 of Table 2).  When added to the $38.6 billion 
in R&D assets, own-produced intangibles exceed the $50.9 billion in conventional 
assets.  And, this comparison ignores the fact that $16.7 billion of the latter are actually 
purchased intangibles and goodwill, implying that the grand total for all intangible capital   15
is $71.6 billion, or 68 percent of all assets.  Most of these intangible assets are related 
to technological knowledge, brand equity, and organizational know-how, so it is not 
unreasonable to conclude that PHARMA is essentially a knowledge-based operation.  
PHARMA has only $10.1 billion in plant and equipment.   
  
E.  A Decomposition of the Sources of PHARMA’s Market Valuation 
 
According to the Compustat data set, the stock market valued PHARMA at $102.9 
billion in 2006, a figure that greatly exceeds the conventional shareholder equity of 
$26.7 billion (ex intangibles).  The size of the gap can be measured by Tobin’s average 
“q”, the ratio of the stock market value to the book value of equity, or its inverse, which 
indicates the fraction of the stock market values explained by the book value of equity.  
These metrics are shown in lines 18 and 19 of Table 2.  They reveal that the traditional 
“10k” measure of shareholder equity explains only 26 percent of PHARMA’s stock 
market value.
14 
  Conventional accounting practice regards this gap as a combination of goodwill 
and identifiable intangibles.  Rather than assuming a priori that it is so, we have inserted 
our cost-based estimates of intangibles into the gap and let the data determine how 
much is due to these intangibles and how much remains unexplained.  We find that 
shareholder equity (inclusive of our intangibles) jumps to $81.7 billion, a figure far closer 
                                                 
14  These estimates refer to the year 2006.  The average market capitalization of the six companies that 
make up PHARMA fell to $75 billion on “Black Friday”, October 10, 2008, at which point the contemporary 
book value of equity explained 40 percent on the market value.  The market value recovered to $84 billion 
on October 20, and the percentage explained fell to 35 percent.  While these figures assign a larger role 
to book value, there is still a large book-to-market gap left unexplained even during a period of extreme 
stock market turbulence.   16
to the stock market’s appraisal of the company.  The corresponding measure of Tobin’s 
“q” falls to 1.26 and shareholder equity now explains 79 percent of PHARMA’s stock 
market value in 2006. 
  This result carries an interesting implication for the average rate of return to 
equity (Tobin’s “q” times the inverse of the price/earnings ratio).  Our estimates for 
PHARMA show that the conventionally measured return on equity is 21 percent when 
intangibles are excluded, and this falls to 14 percent when intangibles are included in 
both the numerator and denominator of the rate of return ratio.  This is a much more 
modest rate of return on equity, and it is even smaller, 7 percent, when intangible assets 
are added to the denominator, but not the numerator.  This version measures the direct 
(cash) return on equity when all the capital that generated the income is counted.  
  Intangible assets do not explain the entire price-to-book gap.  Some part of the 
remaining gap may reflect the volatility of the stock market, with its episodes of 
exuberance and pessimism.  Another part may reflect a “Schumpeterian” gap between 
the ex ante cost-based estimates of the paper value and the ex post innovation rents 
earned by PHARMA.  PHARMA represents the highly successful innovators in the 
industry, and one aspect of this success is that PHARMA is able to identify drug 
discovery programs that generate ex post super-normal profits.  Since the probability of 
developing a successful drug is quite low, the drug-discovery industry is populated with 
less successful ventures.  A more representative sample of the industry would tend to 
show more modest ex post returns and thus a smaller gap between market value and 
book value.    17
Some part of the remaining gap may reflect other problems with the way that 
some balance sheet items are measured.  Three sources of bias have already been 
noted.  First, the balance sheet values tangible assets at the historical price when the 
asset was built or acquired, and ignores the inflation after the original investment.  As 
previously noted, BEA estimates suggest that the balance sheets of U.S. firms under-
state nonresidential business plant and equipment by around 50 percent, implying that 
another $5 billion would be added to the balance sheet if we apply that ratio to 
PHARMA’s plant and equipment in 2006.     
  Second, the 10-year write-off period we assumed for R&D investments may be 
too short.  If a 20-year write-off period were used instead, the R&D stock would be 
$16.6 billion larger.   
Third, there has been no adjustment for the time-value of money. The DiMasi 
estimate suggests that for successful projects the time-value of money almost equals 
the direct cost.  However, only eight percent of the projects are successful, suggesting a 
smaller multiplier for all projects.  If we use 20 percent as the appropriate multiplier for 
PHARMA, and apply it to the $55.2 billion of the R&D stock, the additional write-up in 
value is $11 billion. 
  The sum of the last three factors adds $32.6 billion to equity and, together, they 
explain more than the remaining price-to-book gap of $21.3 billion.  This overshoot 
could signal an error in the preceding adjustments, but it also reflects the fact that the 
component companies of PHARMA performed poorly in the stock market since 2001.  
Investors may be pessimistic about the “fecundity” of R&D programs and may be 
concerned about regulatory risk.   18
  Other sources of error may bias the results in the opposite direction.  We might 
have allocated too much of SG&A costs or operating surplus to R&D and organizational 
structure. But, however imprecise these estimates are, and they certainly are imprecise, 
it is reasonable to conclude that own-produced intangible investments are important in 
explaining the valuation of PHARMA.   
 
F.  Some Pros and Cons of the New View 
 
  It is important to recognize that neither the “old” nor “new” view of the income 
statement is uniquely correct.  The annual sales and the corresponding ex post profits 
reported on the conventional statements provide important ex post information about 
success of the firm in the market place.  Adding $11.4 billion of implicit intangible 
income to actual sales may reveal something about the future prospects of the 
company, but it does not help illuminate how well the company’s product are selling in 
the current year, and may actually obscure this issue.  Moreover, the “new view” 
estimates of intangibles are inaccurate.  They are based on imputations rather than on 
market transactions, and are inferred from the cost of investment.   
  On the other hand, treating R&D as an expense can obscure a company’s true 
long-run position.  For example, many start-up biotechnology companies spend millions 
of dollars developing a new drug and go many years without earning significant 
revenues.  Some of these start-ups become very profitable because their R&D 
programs pay off, but by excluding R&D capital from the financial statements, none of 
this success is anticipated.   19
    Moreover, if a more mature company wants to give the appearance of good 
economic health during rough times, the company can increase its current profits by 
cutting its R&D expenses.
15  In the case of Table 1, if the entire $4.9 billion current R&D 
cost were eliminated, before-tax income in conventional income statement would 
increase by this amount.  Assuming an unchanged average tax rate, 2006 EPS would 
jump from $2.03 to $3.47.  This strategy, however, does not work when R&D is 
capitalized, because EPS in column 3 would fall from $3.74 to $2.66 if current R&D 
were zeroed out.   This occurs because the income statement must deduct the 
amortization costs from past R&D (line 11) to get before-tax income.  More is lost from 
the top line than is offset by a reduction in current cost.  
  
III.  A Broader Look at Financial Accounting with Intangibles 
 
 
  Is the case of PHARMA representative?  After all, PHARMA is a collection of the 
more successful companies in the U.S. economy.  Are intangible assets as important for 
other companies as they are for PHARMA?  To answer this question, we extracted a 
sample of U.S. 617 corporations from the Compustat database of 9885 firms and 
constructed tables for this sample that parallel the items in Tables 1 and 2.
16  Only those 
                                                 
 
15  A lack of transparency is needed in order for this strategy to work, otherwise the financial markets 
would recognize the loss in future value, if any, associated with a reduction in investment in R&D.  Lev 
(2001, 2003) and Bassi et. al. (2004) argue that this tends to be the case, with the implication that current 
accounting practice creates a disincentive for investment in R&D and other expensed intangibles. 
   
16  The Compustat data are derived from company financial statements, adjusted to harmonize them 
across companies.  Thus they do not necessary match the data on the company reports.  There are well-
known risks in using financial statements for time-series and cross-sectional comparisons (see Hall 
(2007)).  Accounting rules change over time, and merger and acquisitions (and spinoffs) occur that can 
greatly affect the income statements and balance sheets of a company.  Comparisons over time, as well   20
companies with R&D and SG&A expenditures for most of the sample period (1988-
2006) were included.  By restricting our sample to firms with a more-or-less continuous 
record of R&D spending, we bias our results in favor of intangibles.
   Around 60 percent 
of the companies in the 617 sample come from just six of the 41 two-digit industries and 
include the largest R&D performers.
17  It is therefore not surprising that the estimates in 
Tables 3 and 4 are comparable to those for PHARMA in Tables 1 and 2.  The fraction of 
617 firms’ market value explained by conventional equity alone is 31 percent and this 
increases to 75 percent when “own” intangibles are included.  The comparable figures 
for PHARMA are 26 percent and 79 percent. 
   
IV.  Are Intangibles Really Capital Assets? 
 
  We noted earlier in this paper that the long gestation periods for the R&D 
programs of the pharmaceutical industry virtually force the conclusion that they should 
be regarded as capital investments, and that this conclusion is reinforced by the body of 
evidence linking intangibles to company valuation and productivity.
18  This conclusion 
                                                                                                                                                             
as the perpetual inventory estimates of the R&D and organizational capital stocks, must be interpreted 
with these caveats in mind.   
 
17   To check the difference between the 617 R&D-intensive companies and the rest, we constructed the 
equivalent to Tables 3 and 4 for the entire sample less those companies.  A comparison of these tables 
with the estimates of Tables 3 and 4 indicate the 617 firms with a complete record are far more intangible-
intensive relative to plant and equipment.  One problem with this comparison is that missing data in the 
latter sample were assigned a zero, whereas the few cases of missing data in the 617-firm sample were 
interpolated.  The problem of missing data is the principal reason that we do not analyze the complete 
sample in this paper. 
 
18  This literature includes studies relating financial market value to R&D (e.g., Hall (1993), Hall and Hall 
(1993), Lev (2001)); managerial and organizational capital (see Bloom and Van Reenen (2006), 
Bryjolfsson and Hitt (2005)), advertising (Hall (1993), Ayanian (1983)), and worker training (Abowd et. al. 
(2005), Bassi et. al. (2004)). 
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can be checked using the Compustat data underlying our intangible stock estimates, 
supplemented by data on stock market prices.   
  The difficulties in using stock market data to value intangibles are now well 
known (Hall (2005) provides a cogent overview of the problems).  The boom-bust stock 
market cycle evident in Figure 2 contrasts sharply with the much smoother trends in the 
intangible stock variables, which are built up from successive investments over the 
years and therefore do not change rapidly, even in periods where investment spending 
is volatile.
  Any attempt to forge a tight link between the two is therefore subject to a 
certain amount of econometric peril. 
  This being said, we can at least check for correlations between the key variables. 
To do this, we further narrowed our sample of R&D-intensive companies to a time-
series, cross-section panel of only the 422 companies that have a complete record of all 
data series for the years 1997-2006.  This smaller sample excludes those companies in 
the 617 data set for which some observations had to be extrapolated or interpolated.  
We then use these data to estimate a model in which the value of a company’s shares, 
t i V , , depends on the book value of the company’s equity,  t i E , , the estimated value of its 
R&D capital,  t i R , , its organizational capital,  t i O , , and the average price-earning ratio  t i Z ,  
of the principal industry to which the company belongs (the latter is included in order to 
account for shifts in financial market optimism about future earnings).   The linear form 
of this model is 
  t t i t i t i t i t i Z O R E V ε λ θ γ β α + + + + + = , , , , ,          (1). 
Variants of this model are found in the literature linking intangibles to stock market 
valuation (see, for example, the discussion in Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2005)).  Some   22
studies use Tobin’s “q” in place of  t i V , ;  the tangible capital stock replaces  t i E ,  in others; 
and various types of intangible stocks or flows are used instead of  t i R ,  and  t i O , , along 
with different ancillary variables. 
  The issue of causality is a potential problem in most of these models (including 
ours).  This problem arises because, while lower rates of investment in intangibles may 
indeed lead to a lower market valuation (the usual interpretation), it may also be the 
case that a deterioration in business prospects leads both to a lower market valuation 
and a lower propensity to invest.  This direction of causality may arise from a common 
economy-wide shock to both variables, like a recession.  In this regard, it has been 
noted in the economic literature that R&D investment tends to be pro-cyclical.
19  Or, the 
problem could arise from firm-specific events in which the diminished (or enhanced) 
prospects for a company jointly affect its market value and its investment programs.      
  The narrower objective of this paper is to test current accounting practice versus 
the “new view” that intangibles have capital value.  Current practice assumes that the 
coefficients of the intangible stocks in equation (1) should not be correlated with market 
value, whereas the “new view” asserts that these coefficients should be positive and 
significantly different from zero.  If they are, the case for capitalizing intangibles is 
enhanced.  Furthermore, in the Hall (2005) zero-rent economy with prefect foresight, no 
                                                 
 
19  Economic explanations of this pro-cyclical behavior of R&D are discussed in Barlevy (2007).  The 
incentive to cut R&D spending during periods of falling profits because R&D is expensed, noted by Lev 
(2001) and Bassi et. al. (2004), may contribute to this problem by offering a way to boost EPS in the near 
term.  However, one problem with these explanations is the inherent nature of research programs.  They 
often involve multi-year commitments, witness the DiMasi data on gestation lags in pharmaceutical R&D, 
and are frequently undertaken in competition with the programs of other firms.  Canceling or slowing this 
sort of R&D program involves more than simply short-run cost considerations.               23
omitted variables, and correctly priced equity, α  and λ  should be zero and β  should 
equal one. 
  To test these hypotheses, we carried out the regression indicated by the 
valuation equation, in both its level form, as shown above, and in its natural logarithms 
(in which case the valuation equation is assumed to be multiplicative).  The first column 
of Table 5 gives the results of imposing the restriction that intangibles do not affect 
market value.  The estimate of β  is 3.59 and is statistically significant, indicating that a 
$1 increase in the book value of equity increases market value by an expected $3.59.  
The average annual industry price/earning ratio also shows a significant positive effect 
on valuation.  However, the constant term,α , is not statistically significant.  Dummy 
variables for each year are also included as a separate control for general market 
effects.  The R-squared statistic is respectably large. 
  The next column introduces the two stocks of intangible capital, but omits equity.  
The results are, again, statistically significant and indicate a large effect, particularly for 
the stock of organizational capital, providing evidence in favor of the capitalization 
hypothesis.  On the other hand, when equity and intangibles are used together, the 
estimated coefficients of all variables fall, and that of the stock of organizational capital 
becomes statistically insignificant though still positive.  However, there is a very high 
correlation between the equity and organizational variables in the data, so it is hard to 
sort out the separate contributions of the two variables.  It is worth recalling, here, that 
the equity and R&D variables are derived from reported data whereas the organizational 
capital is imputed as a faction of SG&A.      24
  Much the same pattern is observed in the last three columns of Table 5, which 
report results for the multiplicative form of the valuation equation.  The key variables are 
transformed to the natural log form, with the result that the parameters are now 
interpreted as elasticities.  Equity by itself is again a strong variable, with the magnitude 
of the coefficient now implying that a one percent change in the amount of equity leads 
approximately to a one percent change in stock market value.  The R&D and 
organizational capital variables, by themselves, are both strongly significant and their 
combined coefficients are close to one.  Again, when all three variables are included in 
the regression, all coefficients fall but the sum continues to be close to one.  The R-
squared statistics in this specification are higher than in the preceding table. 
  A number of other regressions were run for various separate industries and 
years, with varying results.  Organizational capital is a strong explanatory variable in the 
chemical and pharmaceuticals industry but has the wrong sign in Instruments.  
However, the general industry patterns are consistent with the more aggregate Table 5.  
Combined with evidence from past studies, we interpret our results as lending statistical 
support to the case for capitalizing intangibles.  
 
V.  Concluding Remarks 
 
  Financial accounting data are neither inherently right nor wrong.  They are only 
more or less useful for the questions that people want answered.  Some questions 
involve “agency” issues that shareholders and other interested parties seek to monitor 
the actions of managers.  This has inclined accounting principles toward a conservatism   25
that stresses accuracy in valuation and relies on data generated by arms-length market 
transactions. 
  One consequence of this conservatism is that hard-to-value assets like 
intangibles are excluded from the accounts.   According to our estimates, these 
excluded assets explain some 40 to 50 percent of the 2006 market value of R&D-
intensive companies in the U.S., and appear significant in explaining the market-to-
book-value puzzle.  The intrinsic value of corporate America is a lot larger than its book 
equity suggests.  This has an important implication for fair value accounting:  if the book 
value of equity is used as a more accurate indicator of fair value in preference to mark-
to-market rule during sharp downturns in the stock market, the former will greatly 
understate fair value by a potentially large amount.  Another implication is that the 
exclusion of intangible capital from financial statements gives companies an incentive to 
cut back on R&D spending during economic downturns, since these expenditures 
currently add nothing to assets or equity and raise earnings in the short run. 
  The excluded assets also present a different perspective on corporate debt and 
the degree to which a company has leveraged its equity.  The bottom lines of Tables 2 
and 4 show that debt-equity ratios fall significantly when intangibles are included in both 
the numerator and denominator (from 0.91 to 0.30 in the case of PHARMA, and from 
1.46 to 0.61 for the larger sample).  One implication is that the use of debt to finance the 
construction of a company’s “own” intangible assets magnifies the conventionally-
measured debt-equity ratio.  In this situation, the liability is added to the balance sheet, 
while the intangible assets it finances are omitted.   26
  Our findings have yet another implication for the return on corporate equity.  The 
pharmaceutical industry appears to have a large return, 21 percent, when investment in 
intangibles is excluded, but the rate of return on equity falls to a more modest 14 
percent when intangibles are added to the numerator and denominator.  The return is 
even lower, 7 percent, when conventional after-tax net income is compared to a 
measure of equity that reflects the huge investments in R&D and marketing.  We find 
similar results for the larger sample of R&D intensive companies.  Again, it is important 
to count all the capital that matters.  
  The issue of omitted intangibles goes beyond the mechanical problem of adding 
or modifying data on company financial statements.  A company’s accounting data are a 
reflection of its actual economic performance, and this performance is determined in the 
long run by the quality and execution of its business model.  How the data are 
organized and reported should ideally reveal the nature of this model and the 
corresponding organizational structure.  Current accounting practice falls short of this 
ideal because it implicitly portrays the company primarily as a producer of goods and 
services.  Mandel (2006) puts his finger on this problem when he observes that, while 
the Apple iPod is made in China, “Where the gizmo is made is immaterial to its 
popularity.  It is great design, technical innovation, and savvy marketing that have 
helped Apple Computer sell more than 40 million iPods.”  Mandel goes on to observe 
that by ignoring the value of Apple’s large investments in R&D and marketing, that is, by 
imposing a pure production function view of Apple, the company is implicitly portrayed 
as simply a reseller of this phenomenally successful product.   27
  In fact, the modern corporation is most often a complex organization that 
develops, produces (or, increasingly, arranges for others to produce), and markets a 
range of products.  Characterizing this process in all its complexity goes far beyond the 
simple production function framework to a more realistic model of the firm of the sort 
suggested by Penrose (1959).  Developing metrics for this more elaborate description of 
the firm requires a parallel development in the way a company’s performance data are 
organized and presented.  Recognizing that expenditures on product development and 
organizational capability are investments in a company’s future rather than current 
expenses is an important step in this direction.   28
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                                                                      TABLE 1 
 ‘NEW VIEW’ INCOME STATEMENT
1 
BASED ON SIX COMPANY AVERAGE (“PHARMA”)
 
2006 ($ BILLIONS) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                       10k
2        + R&D
2      +ORG K
2 
                                                                                                              
 1.  CONVENTIONAL REVENUE                    $29.6           $29.6            $29.6 
 2.  OWN PRODUCTION OF R&D
3                         $0             $7.2              $7.2 
 3.  OWN PRODUCTION OF ORG. CAPITAL
3             $0                $0          $4.1 
 4.  TOTAL ADJUSTED REVENUE (L1+L2+L3)                $29.6           $36.9            $41.0 
  
 5.  CONVENTIONAL COST OF REVENUE        $6.4            $6.4          $6.4 
 6.  CURRENT COST R&D
4                                   $4.9            $4.9          $4.9  
 7.  CURRENT COST OF SG&A
4                      $8.8            $8.8          $8.8 
 8.  TOTAL CURRENT COST (L5+L6+L7)                 $20.2          $20.2            $20.2 
  
 9.   OPERATING SURPLUS (L4-L8)             $9.5          $16.7            $20.8  
10.  DEPRECIATION ALREADY ACCOUNTED FOR
5        $1.9            $1.9          $1.9  
11.  AMORTIZATION OF OWN R&D
6               $0.0            $3.2          $3.2 
12.  AMORTIZATION OF OWN ORG. CAPITAL
6               $0.0            $0.0          $3.5 
13.  ADJ. OPERATING SUPLUS (L9-L10-L11-L12)             $7.6           $11.6           $12.2 
 
14.  NET INTEREST AND OTHER ADJUSTMENTS            $0.7             $0.7          $0.7 
15.  BEFORE-TAX INCOME (L13-L14)                                 $6.9            $10.9          $11.5   
16.  INCOME TAX PAID
7                                              $1.5             $1.5          $1.5 
17.  AFTER-TAX INCOME                                                      $5.5             $9.5           $10.1 
 
18.  EARNINGS PER SHARE                               $2.03          $3.52           $3.74 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Note 1:  Based on S&P Compustat data and authors’ calculations.  Detail may not add up due to rounding error. 
Note 2:  Column 1, designated “10k”, contains conventional financial data from Compustat;  Column 2, designated 
“+R&D”, adds R&D data to the data of column 1;  Column 3, designated “Org K”, adds organizational capital data 
to column 2.   
Note 3:  “Own Production of R&D” is shadow value of the investment in R&D made by the company.  It is equal to 
current cost of R&D on line 6, all of which is considered to be a capital expenditure, plus markup for profit (imputed 
fraction of line 9 attributable to production of R&D).  “Own Production of Org. Capital” is shadow value of the 
investment in organizational capital made by the company.  It is equal to approximately 30% of current SG&A costs 
on line 7, the portion considered to be a capital expenditure, plus markup for profit (imputed fraction of line 9 
attributable to production of organizational capital).      
Note 4:  Current cost of R&D (line 6) and organizational capital (line 7) is the outlay for labor and materials, plus 
applicable depreciation and amortization.  This differs from the shadow values on lines 3 and 4 (see note 3). 
Note 5:   Conventional Depreciation and amortization are allocated to costs on lines 5 to 7.  They are subtracted, 
here, in order to arrive at net income.   
Note 6:  The amortization of own R&D and organizational capital arises when these items are capitalized, as in 
columns 2 and 3.  R&D is amortized over a 10 year useful life with a quasi-hyperbolic write-off pattern.  
Organizational capital is amortized over a 5 year useful life with a quasi-hyperbolic write-off pattern. 
Note 7:  Assumes that the implicit income from R&D and organizational capital is not taxed.   32
TABLE 2 
 ‘NEW VIEW’ASSET ACCOUNTS
1 
BASED ON SIX COMPANY AVERAGE (“PHARMA”)
 




2                                     10k
3         + R&D
3     + ORG K
 3 
  
 1.  CURRENT ASSETS                       $19.8  $19.8            $19.8 
 2.  PLANT AND EQUIPMENT                     $10.1            $10.1            $10.1 
 3.  PURCHASED INTANGIBLES                       $8.0              $8.0              $8.0 
 4.  GOODWILL                           $8.7    $8.7              $8.7 
 5.  OTHER LONG TERM ASSETS            $4.3              $4.3              $4.3 
 6.  TOTAL ASSETS (L1+L2+L3+L4+L5)                              $50.9            $50.9            $50.9 
    
 7.  TOTAL LIABILTIES                        $24.2            $24.2            $24.2 
 8.  EQUITY                             $26.7            $26.7            $26.7 
  
ADJUSTMENTS FOR OWN INTANGIBLES                             10k           + R&D        + ORG K 
 
 9.   R&D CAPITAL
4                       $0.0             $38.6           $38.6 
10.  ORGANIZATIONAL CAPITAL
4           $0.0     $0.0           $16.3 
11.  ASSETS ADJ. FOR OWN INTANG. (L6+L9+L10)        $50.9             $89.5         $105.8 
12.  EQUITY ADJ. FOR OWN INTANG. (L8+L9+L10)        $26.7             $65.3           $81.6 
 
COMPANY VALUATION                                   10k           + R&D      + ORG K 
       
13.  MARKET VALUE OF EQUITIES
5                  $102.9    $102.9         $102.9 
14.  FINANCIAL VALUE OF FIRM (L13+L7)
6      $127.1    $127.1         $127.1   
15.  CORE FINAN. VALUE OF FIRM (L14-L1-L5)             $103.0    $103.0         $103.0  
16.  CORE ASSETS (L11-L1-L5)                                           $26.9      $65.4           $81.7 
17.  TOTAL INTANGIBLE ASSETS (L3+L4+L9+L10)         $16.8      $55.3           $71.6 
 
VALUATION RATIOS                                                                 10k           + R&D      + ORG K 
      
18.  TOBIN'S EQUITY QE  (L13/L12)                        3.85    1.58            1.26 
19.  PERCENT MV VALUE EXPLAINED (1/ QE)         0.26    0.63            0.79 
20.  DEBT/EQUITY RATIO  (L7/L12)           0.91              0.37            0.30 
21.  RETURN ON EQUITY  (T1 L17/L12)           0.21              0.15            0.14 
________________________________________________________________ 
Note 1:  Based on S&P Compustat data and authors’ calculations.    Detail may not add up due to rounding error. 
Note 2:  Conventional balance sheet items recorded at historical cost. 
Note 3:  See note 2 of Table 1. 
Note 4:  See note 2 of Table 1 for amortization assumptions.  Note also that valuation of intangibles is at current, not 
historical, cost. 
Note 5:   Average monthly market value of outstanding equities.   
Note 6:   Average monthly market value of outstanding equities plus balance sheet liabilities.   33
 
TABLE 3 
S&P CORPORATIONS WITH CONTINUOUS R&D 
‘NEW VIEW’ INCOME STATEMENT
1 
2006 ($ BILLIONS) 
 
  10 k  + R&D  + ORG K 
     
1. CONVENTIONAL REVENUE   $4899 $4899  $4899
2. OWN PRODUCTION OF R&D  $0 $220  $220
3. OWN PRODUCTION OF ORG. CAPITAL  $0 $0  $399
4. TOTAL ADJUSTED REVENUE (L1+L2+L3)  $4899 $5119  $5518
     
5. CONVENTIONAL COST OF REVENUE  $3283 $3283  $3283
6. CURRENT COST R&D  $165 $165  $165
7. CURRENT COST OF SG&A  $658 $658  $658
8. TOTAL CURRENT COST (L5+L6+L7)  $4106 $4106  $4106
     
9. OPERATING SURPLUS (L4-L8)  $793 $1013  $1412
10. DEPRECIATION ALREADY ACCOUNTED FOR  $191 $191  $191
11. AMORTIZATION OF OWN R&D  $0 $134  $134
12. AMORTIZATION OF OWN ORG. CAPITAL  $0 $0  $318
13. ADJ. OPERATING SURPLUS (L9-L10-L11-L12) $602 $688  $769
     
14. NET INTEREST AND OTHER ADJUSTMENTS  $18 $18  $18
15. BEFORE-TAX INCOME (L13-L14)  $584 $670  $751
16. INCOME TAX PAID  $192 $192  $192
17. AFTER-TAX INCOME  $392 $478  $559
   
18. EARNINGS PER SHARE  $2.48 $3.03  $3.54
 
1.  Data from 617 R&D-intensive U.S. corporations.  See notes to preceding tables.   34
TABLE 4 
S&P CORPORATIONS WITH CONTINUOUS R&D 
‘NEW VIEW’ BALANCE SHEET
1 
2006 ($ BILLIONS) 
 
      
CONVENTIONAL BALANCE SHEET  10 k  + R&D  + ORG K 
      
1. CURRENT ASSETS  $1726 $1726  $1726
2. PLANT AND EQUIPMENT  $1389 $1389  $1389
3. PURCHASED INTANGIBLES  $210 $210  $210
4. GOODWILL  $604 $604  $604
5. OTHER LONG TERM ASSETS  $778 $778  $778
6. TOTAL ASSETS (L1+L2+L3+L4+L5)  $4707 $4707  $4707
   
7. TOTAL LIABILITIES      $2795      $2795     $2795
8. EQUITY   $1910 $1910  $1910
   
     
ADJUSTMENTS FOR OWN INTANGIBLES 
 
10 k  + R&D  + ORG K 
9. R&D CAPITAL  $0 $1239  $1239
10. ORGANIZATIONAL CAPITAL  $0 $0  $1448
11. ASSETS ADJ. FOR OWN INTANG. (L6+L9+L10)  $4707 $5946  $7394
12. EQUITY ADJ. FOR OWN INTANG. (L8+L9+L10)  $1910 $3149  $4597
     
COMPANY VALUATION 
 
10 k  + R&D  + ORG K 
13. MARKET VALUE OF EQUITIES  $6146 $6146  $6146
14. FINANCIAL VALUE OF FIRM (L13+L7)  $8941 $8941  $8941
15. CORE FINAN. VALUE OF FIRM (L14-L1-L5)  $6437 $6437  $6437
16. CORE ASSETS (L11-L1-L5)  $2203 $3442  $4890
17. TOTAL INTANGIBLE ASSETS (L3+L4+L9+L10)  $814 $2053  $3501
     
VALUATION RATIOS 
 
10 k  + R&D  + ORG K 
18. TOBIN’S EQUITY QE (L13/L12)  3.22 1.95  1.34
19. PERCENT MV VALUE EXPLAINED (1/QE) 0.31 0.51  0.75
20. DEBT/EQUITY RATIO  (L7/L12)   1.46 0.89  0.61
   
21.  RETURN ON EQUITY  (T3 L17/L12)  0.21 0.15  0.14
1.  Data from 617 R&D-intensive U.S. corporations.  See notes to preceding tables. 




DETERMINANTS OF MARKET VALUE 
S&P SAMPLE OF 422 COMPANIES WITH 
COMPLETE RECORD OF R&D 
 
   
LEVELS 
   
LOGS 
  (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) (6) 










































Y Y Y    Y Y Y 
 













R-SQUARED  0.72 0.76 0.79    0.93 0.89 0.94 
#OBS  4220 4220 4220    4220 4220 4220 
 
 
Notes:  Firm-level panel data drawn from Compustat covering the period 1997 to 2006.  The 
dependent variable is the average of the monthly market value of a firm.  The results in columns 
(1), (2), and (3) refer to specification in which the variables are in levels.  The results in columns 
(4), (5), and (6) refer to specification in which market value, equity, R&D stock, and the stock 
organizational capital (“Org” stock) are transformed to natural logarithms.  The P/E ratio is the 
corresponding industry average for each company.  Standard errors are clustered by 2-digit 
industries. 
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PHARMA (Six Co. Composite) 
Decomposition of Market Value




































Decomposition of Financial Market Value










97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06
year
$
 
t
r
i
l
l
i
o
n
s residual value
organizational capital
R&D assets
equity
 
 
FIGURE 2 
 